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Open Source Movements and Iran: NedaNet

Background: In late June, following the Iranian government’s repression of public protest over the results of the 2009 elections, an ad-hoc network of internet specialists formed in support of the protesters. Fronted by open source advocate Eric S. Raymond, NedaNet, named in commemoration of the killing of Neda Agha-Soltan, provides information necessary for people within Iran to anonymously reach and publish to sites government filtering would otherwise make inaccessible.

Tools: Tor, blogs, IRC, email, USB drives, phones, word-of-mouth

How these tools are being used: NedaNet members maintain documents that explore how to bypass the Iranian government’s highly sophisticated and adaptable filters and work to anticipate what they will screen next. While the group currently recommends Tor for accessing the Internet from within Iran, they are also actively considering alternatives that could take over should current methods to evade the filters suddenly be blocked. They also maintain contact with people in Iran to help them keep continued Internet access.

More “interlinking circles of collaboration” than an organization, members of NedaNet communicate through blogs, IRC chats and websites that provide forums for members to gather more information and exchange ideas. Twitter hash tags provide topics for searches that lead to those forums. The groups working together mostly remain separate for security. As open source advocates, many of the members knew of each other through that arena. In fact, Raymond was one of the originators of the movement.

In the earlier days of the protests, proxies were collected and distributed via email and phone to people within Iran to enable them to bypass the restrictions. However, once it became known that the Iranian government had started deep-packet inspection on all traffic, activists were and still are advised against setting up or using proxies. Use of a Tor client removes the need for them.

While access to the Tor Project site is usually filtered, the site has many mirrors from which the client can be downloaded. According to recent Tor Project metrics, “there were around 7800 new and returning Iranian Tor users on June 24. By ‘returning’, we mean Tor clients that were off for at least several days, so they didn’t have cached directory information.” This suggests that Tor use was widespread even before the protests began. The same report notes that “bridge usage from Iran has boosted to 950% as compared to June 1.” As users receive copies of Tor clients over email or exchange them via USB drives, this could increase.

Challenges: As an open source based group, NedaNet believes that the test of a secure solution is that it works even if how it does so is public knowledge. Consequently, new solutions are at risk of attack even as they are being built. This however, is also one of the strengths of open source solutions and internet technologies have historically been built in the field. A bigger challenge at least for users within Iran is the general lack of bandwidth which makes any internet solution more difficult. Even before the election, 256Kbit was legally the cap on bandwidth for most people in Iran, according to one researcher. Furthermore, NedaNet recognizes that Tor is only a temporary solution.

Analysis: As an unstructured organization, NedaNet has the advantage of being able to maintain a high level of security for its members. Using open source tools in the field allows their solutions to be tested even as they are built, which is important for a security product which will be fully exposed the moment it is used. However, both the decentralization and the openness make it challenging to develop and deploy new solutions quickly and efficiently while simultaneously trying to remain fairly covert. While most of the members exist outside Iran, security is a real concern.

NedaNet servers are crowd-sourced, all work is performed pro bono and they do not currently accept donations. During this crisis a lot of energy is being directed towards this effort. However, once the perceived need ebbs, it will require focus to direct such a decentralized group in order to stay ahead of the government. Considering its relationships, even if tenuous, to other anonymous and free net groups, NedaNet will be able to take advantage of work being performed on behalf of other initiatives around the world.

Using pre-existing tools means the time to launch is shortened and the team can move on to developing long term measures. However, those tools come with known risks which make them temporary at best. Developing a lasting solution requires balancing the essential non-organized nature of the group with the various needs for security, field-testing, and rapid development.