DigiActive.org

R@D: Mobile Phones as a Tool for Civil Resistance - Case Studies from Serbia and Belarus

The purpose of Research@DigiActive (R@D) is to produce applied, thought-provoking, actionable research at the cutting edge of Digital Activism. It seeks to highlight and disseminate studies in the new academic field of digital activism by publishing short papers by promising scholars. To submit a paper or get more information, please contact our Director of Applied Research, Patrick Meier, at Patrick AT Digiactive.org.

Title: Mobile Phones as a Tool for Civil Resistance - Case Studies from Serbia and Belarus

Author: Fabien Miard

Abstract: The recent so-called “Twitter Revolutions” in Moldova and Iran have created a renewed interest in the role of new communication technologies in civil resistance and social protest activities. It is a new example in a growing list of events where such technologies played an important role in facilitating protests. Twitter and other microblogging platforms represent a new phenomenon because they easily work across different types of communication technologies such as instant messaging, blogging, and text messaging. This convergence also draws attention to the wide-spread use of mobile phones in civil resistance, a factor often overlooked by Internet enthusiasts. This R@D product summarizes some key insights from interviews with civil activists in both Serbia and Belarus that were part of a master thesis project on mobile phone usage in protest movements, and it links them to insights gained from the recent “Twitter Revolutions”. Although the cases of Serbia and Belarus might initially seem similar because of their geographic proximity, struggles with dictatorial leaders, and historical Communist dominance, mobile phone use by activists in these countries is markedly different. Mobile phones were a critical tactical tool in bringing down Milosevic in 2000. However, only 8 years later, mobiles are less useful to anti-Lukashenka Belarusian activists in the present day because of the state’s increasingly effective surveillance of mobile communication.

Read the publication…

Livestream presentation on digital activism

Tune in today at 10:30 am EST to see  a livestreamed presentation by DigiActive co-founder Mary Joyce and correspondent Gaurav Mishra from Participation Camp in New York City.    Mary will be giving an introduction to the field of digital activism and Gaurav will focus on digital activism in India.  (Slides for Mary’s introduction to digital activism are available here.)

Click here for livestream

UPDATE: It appears that part of the presentation is still available on Livestream.  If you click the link above or the image you will see the end of the Q&A session and then the video cycles back to the beginning of Gaurav’s talk. 

Quick Guide to Secure Communication

UPDATE: Version 5.0 is now available in .doc form (click here to download).

Patrick Meier, DigiActive’s director of applied research, has created a very thorough list of ways to stay safe and protect your data while taking part in digital activism in repressive countries. We have reproduced Patrick’s list of tactics and technologies below and we encourage you to read his original post on his blog iRevolution to learn more about his conceptual framing of these issues as well as to read the useful feedback in the comments section. For more in-depth information on digital security for activists, check out Tactical Tech’s Security in-a-box.

Since this is quite a long list, here is a table of contents. The list below (which continues after the jump) contains both tactics and technologies for keeping safe while using the following devices and applications:

• Mobile Phones
• Digital Cameras
• Computers/Laptops
• Flash Disks
• E-mail
• Browsers and Web Sites
• VoIP (online telephony)
• Blogs and Social Networking Sites
• File Sharing
• Cyber Cafes

Security Tactics

• Mobile Phones
  • Purchase your mobile phone far from where you live. Buy lower-end, simple phones that do not allow third-party applications to be installed. Higher-end ones with more functionalities carry more risk. Use cash to purchase your phone and SIM card. Avoid town centers and find small or second-hand shops as these are unlikely to have security cameras. Do not give your real details if asked; many shops do not ask for proof of ID.
  • Use multiple SIM cards and multiple phones and only use pay-as-you go options; they are more expensive but required for anonymity.
  • Remove the batteries from your phone if you do not want to be geo-located and keep the SIM card out of the phone when not in use and store in separate places.Use your phone while in a moving vehicle to reduces probability of geo-location.
  • Never say anything that may incriminate you in any way.
  • Use code.
  • Use Beeping instead of SMS whenever possible. Standard text messages are visible to the network operator, including location, phone and SIM card identifiers. According to this recent paper, the Chinese government has established 2,800 SMS surveillance centers around the country to monitor and censor text messages. The Chinese firm Venus Info Tech Ltd sells real-time content monitoring and filtering for SMS.
  • Use fake names for your address book and memorize the more important numbers. Frequently delete your text messages and call history and replace them with random text messages and calls. The data on your phone is only deleted if it is written over with new data. This means that deleted SMS and contact numbers can sometimes be retrieved (with a free tool like unDeleteSMS. Check your phone’s settings to see whether it can be set to not store sent texts messages and calls.
  • Eavesdropping in mobile phone conversations is technically complicated although entirely possible using commercially available technology. Do not take mobile phones with you to meetings as they can be turned into potential listening/tracking devices. Network operators can remotely activate a phone as a recording device regardless of whether someone is using the phone or whether the phen is even switched on. This functionality is available on US networks.
  • Network operators can also access messages or contact information stored on the SIM card. If surveillance takes place with the co-operation of the operator, little can be done to prevent the spying.
  • Mobile viruses tend to spread easily via Bluetooth so the latter should be turned off when not in use.
  • Using open Bluetooth on phones in group situations, e.g., to share pictures, etc., can be dangerous. At the same time, it is difficult to incriminate any one person and a good way to share information when the cell phone network and Internet are down.
  • Discard phones that have been tracked and burn them; it is not sufficient to simply destroy the SIM card and re-use the phone.

• Digital Cameras
  • Keep the number of sensitive pictures on your camera to a minimum.
  • Add plenty of random non-threatening pictures (not of individuals) and have these safe pictures locked so when you do a “delete all” these pictures stay on the card.
  • Keep the battery out of the camera when not in use so it can’t be turned on by others.
  • Practice taking pictures without having to look at the view screen.

• Computers/Laptops
  • Use passphrases for all your sensitive data.
  • Keep your most sensitive files on flash disks and find safe places to hide them.
  • Have a contingency plan to physically destroy or get rid of your computer at short notice.

• Flash disks
  • Purchase flash disks that don’t look like flash disks.
  • Keep flash disks hidden.

• Email communication
  • Use code.
  • Use passphrases instead of passwords and change them regularly. Use letters, numbers and other characters to make them “c0mpLeX!”. Do not use personal information and changer your passphrases each month. Do not use the same password for multiple sites.
  • Never use real names for email addresses and use multiple addresses.
  • Discard older email accounts on a regular basis and create new ones.
  • Know the security, safety and privacy policies of providers and monitor any chances (see terms of service tracker).

• Browsers and websites
  • Turn off java and other potentially malicious add-ons.
    
  • Learn IP addresses of visited websites so that history shows only numbers and not names.
  • When browsing on a public computer, delete your private data (search history, passwords, etc.) before you leave.
  • When signing up for an account where you will be publishing sensitive media, do not use your personal email address and don’t give personal information.
  • Don’t download any software from pop-ups, they may be malicious and attack your computer or record your actions online.
  • Do not be logged in to any sensitive site while having another site open.

• VoIP
  • Just because your talking online doesn’t mean you are not under surveillance.
  • As with a cell or landline, use code do not give salient details about your activities, and do not make incriminating statements.
  • Remember that your online activities can be surveilled using offline techniques. It doesn’t matter if you are using encrypted VOIP at a cyber cafe if the person next to you is an under-cover police officer.
  • When possible, do not make sensitive VOIP calls in a cyber cafe. It is simply too easy for someone to overhear you. If you must, use code that doesn’t stand out.

• Blogs and social networking sites
  • Know the laws in your country pertaining to liability, libel, etc.
  • When signing up for a blog account where you will be publishing sensitive content, do not use you personal email address or information.
  • In your blog posts and profile page, do not post pictures of yourself or your friends, do not use your real name, and do not give personal details that could help identify you (town, school, employer, etc.).
  • Blog platforms like wordpress allow uses to automatically publish a post on a designated date and time. Use this functionality to auto-publish on a different day when you are away from the computer.
  • On social networks, create one account for activism under a false but real-sounding name (so your account won’t be deleted) but don’t tell your friends about it. The last thing you want is a friend writing on your wall or tagging you in a photo and giving away your identity.
  • Even if you delete your account on a social networking site, your data will remain, so be very careful about taking part in political actions (i.e., joining sensitive groups) online.
  • Never join a sensitive group with your real account. Use your fake account to join activism groups. (The fake account should not be linked to your fake email).
  • Don’t use paid services. Your credit card can be linked back to you.

• File sharing
  • Use a shared Gmail account with a common passphrase and simply save emails instead of sending. Change passphrase monthly.
  • For sharing offline, do not label storage devices (CDs, flash drives) with the true content. If you burn a CD with an illegal video or piece of software on it, write an album label on it.
  • Don’t leave storage devices in places where they would be easily found if your office or home were searched (i.e., on a table, in a desk drawer).
  • Keep copies of your data on two flash drives and keep them hidden in separate locations.
  • When thinking of safe locations, consider who else has access. Heavily-traveled locations are less safe.
  • Don’t travel with sensitive data on you unless absolutely necessary. If you need to, make sure to hide it on your person or “camouflage” it (label a data CD as a pop music CD). See Sneakernet.

• Internet Cafes
  • Assume you are being watched.
  • Assume computers at cyber cafes are tracking key strokes and capturing screenshots.
  • Avoid cyber cafes without an easy exit and have a contingency plan if you need to leave rapidly.

Security Technologies

• Mobile phones
  • Use CryptoSMS, SMS 007 or Kryptext to text securely (this requires java-based phones).
  • Use Android Guardian as soon as it becomes available.
  • Access mobile versions of websites as they are usually not blocked. In addition, connecting to mobile websites provides for faster connections.

• Digital cameras
  • Use scrubbing software such as: JPEG stripper to remove the metadata (Exif data) from your pictures before you upload/email.
  • Have a safe Secure Digital Card (SD) that you can swap in. Preferably, use a mini SD card with a mini SD-SD converter. Then place the mini SD into a compatible phone for safekeeping.

• Computers/Laptops
  • Use an effective anti-virus program and ensure it updates itself online at least once a day: TMIS, McAfee, Symantec/Norton, AVG, Avira, NOD32, Kaspersky.
  • Do not use illegal, cracked, hacked, pwned, warez software.
  • Keep your software programs (operating systems, productivity suites, browsers) up-to-date with the latest software updates.
  • Use software to encrypt your hard drive: Bitlocker, TrueCrypt, PGP Whole Disk Encryption, Check Point, Dekart Private Disk.
  • Use a different file type to hide your sensitive files. For example, the .mov file extension will make a large file look like a movie.
  • Mac users can use Little Snitch to track all the data that goes into and out of your computer.
  • From a technical perspective, there’s no such thing as the delete function. Your deleted data is eventually written over with new data. There are two common ways to wipe sensitive data from your hard drive or storage device. You can wipe a single file or you can wipe all of the ‘unallocated’ space on the drive. Eraser is a free and open-source secure deletion tool that is extremely easy to use.

• Flash disks
  • StealthySurfer USB Flash Drive
  • The secure browsing Tor software can be installed on flash disk.
  • Using a USB watch calls less attention as do the USB ear rings and this credit card USB flash disk.

• Email communication
  • Use https when using Gmail.
  • Use encrypted email platforms such as Hushmail and RiseUp.

• Browsers and websites
  • Use Firefox and get certain plugins to follow website tracking such as ghostery and adblock, adart to remove ads/trackers.
  • User Tor software or Psiphon to browse privately and securely.
  • I shan’t list access points for secure browsers, Proxy servers and VPNs here. Please email me for a list.
  • Always use https in “Settings/General/Browser Connection.”

• VoIP
  • Use Skype but not TOM Skype (Chinese version). Note that Skype is not necessarily 100% secure since no one has access to the source code to verify.
  • Off The Record (OTR) is a good encryption plugin. For example, use Pidgin with OTR (you need to add the plug-in yourself).
  • Gizmo offer encryption for voice conversations, and then only if you are calling another VoIP user, as opposed to a mobile or landline telephone. However, because neither application is open-source, independent experts have been unable to test them fully and ensure that they are secure.
  • Adium is a free IM application for Macs with built-in OTR encryption that integrates most other IM applications.

• Blogs and social networking platforms
  • There are no safe social networks. The best way to be safe on a social network is fake account and a proxy server.
  • The anonymous blogging platform Invisiblog no longer exists, so the best bet now is WordPress + Proxy (preferably Tor) + anonymity of content.
  • Log out of facebook.com when not using the site.

• File sharing
  • Use Drop.io to create a private, secure media sharing site.
  • Use BasecampHQ with secure/SSL option to create more specific usernames and passwords for each user or remote site.

• Internet Cafe
  • Tor can be installed on flash disk and used at Internet cafe and also used from LiveCDs if flash drives are not allowed.

• Other potential tech
  • LiveScribe (see explanation here).
  • FreedomFone

image: amelungc/Flickr

Action of “Omission” to Protest Chinese Censorship

What: To protest the implementation of the Green Dam Youth Escort filtering program on all computers sold in China, the blogger Ai Wei Wei is asking Chinese  users to boycott the Internet on July 1st, 2009.

When: July 1st is the date on which Green Dam much come pre-installed (or on an attached disk) for all new Chinese computers.

Where: People’s Republic of China

Why: To protest Green Dam in particular and Chinese censorship in general.

Who: We previously wrote about Ai Weiwei’s largely successful effort to collect the names of the children killed in the Sichuan earthquake last year.  He is also a well-known artist, who helped design the Olympic “Bird’s Nest” stadium in Beijing.

How: Via Twitter, Ai asked people to “Stop any online activities, including working, reading, chatting, blogging, gaming and mailing.  Don’t explain your behavior.”  The interesting aspect of this protest is that Ai is trying to create a political action which does not entail risk to participants.  By asking people not to acknowledge they are taking part in a boycott, Ai hopes to protect them from persecution by Chinese authorities.

It is hard to claim innocence when taking part in a political actions of “commission,” even one that is apparently innocent.  (In Belarus in 2006, for example, young people were arrested for assembling to eat ice cream.)  However, an action of “omission” puts the government in a more complicated position.  After all, not using the Internet isn’t criminal.  It will be interesting to see how many people participate in the action and whether or not the action of omission becomes a new strategy in digital activism.

Hat-tip: Stan Schroeder on Mashable

Image Source: Daily News

What Neda Means: Citizen Media Frames the Protests

From left: a paining of Neda made by annebot, videos of Neda’s murder on YouTube,
an altered profile image on Twitter shifts the “where’s my vote?” meme

Background:  In his post on Saturday, DigiActive correspondent Hamid Tehrani referred in passing to “a scene of a girl murdered by security forces.”  A few days later and we all know who she was - Neda Agha Soltan, a 26-year-old killed en route to a protest in Tehran.  Only in this age, where every citizen with a cell phone can became a journalist and broadcaster is the story of Neda possible.

Tools: The story of Neda’s rise to prominence and powerful symbolism is a story of citizen media: from the cell phone cameras that recorded her death (video here - it is graphic), to the blogger who posted her story on the citizen journalism site NewsVine, to the Twitter conversation around the hashtag #Neda, and the Wikipedia entry that recorded the details of her murder in detail.   Finally her story reached the mainstream media: CNN, The New York Times, and Iranian television.

Analysis:  This is the story of Neda’s transformation from a person into a symbol.  But what does this story mean?  In particular, what does it mean for digital activism? Usually when we think of the use of digital technology for activism we think of communication tools which facilitate mass collective action: SMS, Facebook groups, listservs.  Yet the idea of Neda, though it may have inspired rage, sadness, and a commitment to continue protes, was not what we traditionally think of as digital activism.

Neda didn’t organize a protest but she helped to firmly re-frame the post-election protests in Iran.  The frame, or narrative, which the Iranian government was pushing was that the protests were caused by Western meddling and that the protesters were terrorists.   By making Neda the symbol of the opposition - a beautiful and unarmed young woman, previously apolitical - the new frame has moved firmly to those in the streets: the protesters are innocent idealists.  The government is murdering its people without cause.  Neda is not a terrorist.  She is a martyr (or so the Times story framed it).  And the practical effect of this re-framing on protests in Iran?  A renewed commitment to go out in the street every day, an ideal that Neda will not have died in vain.

Lessons:  What are the lessons for activists who wish to use citizen media to frame a public issue?  First, the media should be clear and emotional.  Neda’s video - the most spreadable form of media about her sotry - was raw and visceral.  Without understanding the words of the men trying to help her or knowing much of the story it was possible to empathize with her and feel the pain of her injustice.  It was international.

Second, push the media out on multiple platforms.  It is unclear where the video was first uploaded, though there are now several versions on YouTube.   The story was also pushed out through Newsvine, a news site accessible to ordinary citizens, and through Twitter.   Third, your goal should be to get into the mainstream media.  This is still where the majority of eyes are.  Email your content to media sources, but only if this will not put you in danger.  Finally, make is personal.  We understand news through human stories.  In America, we came to saw the corruption of our economic crisis through the crooked financier of Bernie Madoff.   Heroes too personify a struggle.

Citizen Media & the Iranian Protests: Exhibit A

One the big stories with regard to digital activism in Iran has been the use of citizen media to disseminate information about the protests (see references here, here, and here).  The picture above, from the front page of today’s New York Times is putatively an image of the daughter of reformist cleric Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, but could just as easily be an illustration of the new media environment: no less than eight cell phones and digital cameras (red circles) are recording the event the New York Times reporter was photographing.  (For a large version of the photo, click here.) It’s old print media and new digital citizen media juxtaposed in a single image.

image source: New York Times

Topic: Black bloggers reflect on digital activism

Description: The second annual Blogging While Brown conference concluded yesterday in Chicago, presenting a recharged enthusiasm for the potentials social media tools can present for digital activism. In what was possibly the largest gathering of African American bloggers and web content users since the election of the “Internet President” Barack Obama, there is a call from many in the black community to use Web 2.0 to actively campaign more on behalf of issues of most concern.

What Was Discussed: The online organizing and fundraising around Jena 6, led by Web-based activist group Color of Change, to date is still considered the most successful Internet campaign among African Americans. However, the ongoing protests and digital activism in the aftermath of Iran’s presidential election last week have brought up some new thoughts on how the African Diaspora could handle social movements - past, present and in the near future. Some conference attendees wondered if the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the Rwandan Genocide and the start of violence in Darfur could have had different outcomes if today’s communications tools were around at the time of these events.

“What if black bloggers protested the Bush administration after [Hurricane] Katrina, like the Iranian protesters are doing now with their government,” said one attendee. “We can learn a lot from the Iranians.”

There was also discussion about how the black blogosphere will hold the first African American commander-in-chief and other politicians accountable on various domestic and international issues, such as health care, education, the war on terror, environmental justice, drug and criminal reform, unemployment and AFRICOM.

However, many agreed that possibly the next digital battle should be to make sure that the Internet is accessible to all. According to Megan Tady of the media reform group, Free Press, only 40 percent of Americans have access to broadband. When that number is broken down by ethnicity, Emarketer statistics show that African Americans make up 13.4 percent of the U.S. population, but only 48.7 percent are online. Mobile technology is a widely used tool in this demographic, and text messaging was used by Katrina survivors after the storm.

Impact: With all the above discussed topics, clearly there is a yearning to take advantage of the new digital era. Gina McCauley, BWB founder, said she will make efforts at future conferences to make sure attendees will have all the available training to stay on top of their social media skills.

“Now is the time for us to stay ahead of the curve on this technology so we can make a difference in our community,” she said.

Digital Activism in Iran: Beyond the Headlines

clockwise from top-left: Gholamhossein Karbaschi’s Twitter page, the reformist web site Ghalam News, YouTube video of a nurses’ protest taken by a citizen journalist, Mir Hossein Mousavi’s Facebook page, toolbar from Kalamhe, another reformist site

Background:  Protests against Iran’s presidential election results continue despite the warning of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Friday.  However, Iranian reformist candidates Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoub and their supporters have few communications options. They have no access to national TV, radio, or newspapers, which are under state control.   Text messaging is being blocked and web sites are filtered.  How are they able to organize a huge protest movement?

While the mainstream media has focused on the role of Twitter and decentralized organizing, the real picture of digital activism in Iran is more complex.  Protests are organized centrally by the campaigns of reformist candidates and then that information is disseminated both online and off.  The role of citizens with regard to social media is as citizen journalists, using YouTube and Twitter to report on what is happening, rather than to organize the protests.  Since this activity is intended for an international audience (and is in English) it is no wonder that this use of social media is more visible to a Western audience than the online tactics actually being used to organize the protests.

Tools: web sites, Facebook, Twitter, mouth-to-ear networks

How these tools are being used:  With regard to the post-election protests, decisions are made centrally by Mousavi and Karoubi and their campaigns. When they take their decisions they communicate them in different ways. First, they publish them on their websites, for example Kalamhe and Ghalam news.  Web 1.0 (as well as totally offline communication methods) are just as important as Web 2.0 (social media), though the latter is receiving for more attention.

Second, the reformist leaders use social networking systems to communicate these message. On Saturday Mir Hussein Mousavi’s Facebook published the news that demonstration will be held today. Mousavi has more than 65,000 supporters in his Facebook group and every message can reach this army of people directly.  Supporters were also asked to pass the message to others, implying that the leaders are deliberately making use of their supporters’ online and offline personal networks.   One of the main ways to organize the demonstrations  is person-to-person communication or talking with friends and neighbors… the mouth-to-ear method.  It still works and no government can shut it down.  (Maybe Iranian leaders imagine a divine power can prevent this form of communication as it did in the election.)

Third, as has already been noted (and overemphasized) in the mainstream media,  Twitter is being used.  However, the dynamic is different than has been previously reported.  Gholamhossein Karbaschi, a top adviser to Karoubi, communicates about his activity on his Twitter account (@gkarbaschi, in Farsi).  This is one of the only instances where Twitter is actually being used to organize protest inside Iran and again, this is centralized organization coming from the campaign of a reformist candidate.  An indication of the centralized nature of Twitter for organizing in Iran: @gkarbaschi has over 4,700 followers but is not following the feeds of any other users.  He is using social media to broadcast to a domestic audience, not to interact.

As has also been noted, people in Iran are using Twitter as an important broadcast (rather than organizing) tool to report events, slogans, and minute by minute protest movement. In this way, Twitter has turned a local struggle into a national and  international one.  A scene of a girl murdered by security forces is one dramatic example of news reported on Twitter.  As many reporters and interested observers around the world have learned, it also allows an international audience to follow the event in real time.

Finally, Iranian citizens upload films from around country on YouTube to show demonstrations, protest movements and reformists’ messages.  International mainstream media are using these citizen videos in their Iran coverage.  This combination of Web 1.0 and Web 2.0, central organization and decentralized dissemination shows the flexibility of these tools and the true complexity of the use of digital activism in Iran.

Iranian Elections, Information Sharing and Twitter

Earlier this week, amidst travel and trying really hard to work, I followed the events of what was happening in Iran post-election.  I followed it all on Twitter.

There are many comments I could make on the events, but I wanted to highlight something that will be important for how information and participation happens in the months and years to come.

The fact is, we are all becoming a larger part of the information dissemination mechanisms that were once reserved for formal media channels.  DigiActive has reported many instances of citizen journalism, on-the-ground reporting and information gathering, but now we’re talking about the addition of a process of broader dissemination.

We’re “regular” people, we have the information coming to us, and it’s our choice to pass it on or not.  The reason I  read hardly a single newspaper article on the topic all day was because I was getting my information handed to me by people from Boston, Europe, Iran… everywhere.  Regular people.  I got all the relevant links I needed from those 140-character posts.

The fact is, we are all now part of the information dissemination mechanism now.  When I reported on the Moldovan protests in April, I noted that part of the process that we were seeing was not necessarily just that the protesters were using social media tools to get their message out, but that the resulting international furvor that erupted was fueled by other people who were not on the ground.  Not even in the country.

This time around, we saw this same process magnified immensely.  A message from Mousavi highlights how important this process was not only in what was said - One Person = One Broadcaster - but also in the the resulting relay-like speed that the message reached the world.

Mousavi recognized the the power of this information stream.  Clay Shirky alluded to it in his Q&A with TED on the topic, and colleague Gaurav Mishra highlighted it in his analysis of the events as well.

No one was told to do anything with the information coming out of Iran, or had any explicit instructions to do so.  The messages could have remained dead in the water.  But we were all engaged by what was happening, we were interacting with other people through discussion, and we genuinely wanted to participate by adding to the conversation, spreading the information and learning more about the situation.

The fact that people had real-time, important information in their hands that they could “touch and feel,” and their ability to actively join in the conversation and the spread of vital information made momentary journalists out of us all.  And it will continue to do so more and more in the future.

“Where is My Vote?”: Iranian Expats Organize Online

UPDATE: I’ve changed the title of this post to reflect the fact that it is Iranian expats who are using Facebook for organizing.  I have not seen evidence of the tool being used effectively to organize within the country.

Background: On June 14th , Iranian expatriates and supporters around the world protested the results of an election in which President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad claimed a statistically unlikely landslide victory over challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi. The new slogan became “where is my vote?” as protesters asked why the votes of Mousavi supporters had not been counted. The campaign, which I will describe below, has both centralized and decentralized elements and has succeeded so far in organizing worldwide protest.

The question is, will this structure allow for the sustained campaigning necessary to overturn the vote? In the language of Gaurav Mishra’s 4 C’s of Social Media, this campaign has achieved Content creation and Collaboration on collective action, but will it be able to create a Community which will sustain longterm action once the Iranian election is gone from the headlines?

Tools: Facebook, Twitter, stand-alone web sites, citizen media sites

How these tools are being used: This campaign began before Election Day.  Setade Ma (meaning “our campaign”), a site launched at the end of May, encouraged voting in the upcoming election. The central action associated with this campaign was worldwide simultaneous demonstrations on May 31st (similar to those that occurred on the 14th). At the May 31st demonstrations, participants around the world were asked to hold banners saying “we vote” and then to submit those photos to the central site, similar to the geographically-dispersed take-a-photo tactic used in the US for the Step it Up campaign against global warning and in Morocco for the Help Erraji campaign. (It is not clear how people outside Iran were actually going to vote in the election, unless Iran has an effective system of absentee ballots, but the goal seemed to be to create a mass movement in favor of voting.)  Showing awareness of the ability of social media to spread a campaign, the site also linked to its own Facebook group, Twitter stream, and a page on Balitarin, a community website that helps its users find links of interest on the Iranian Internet.

This previous organizing proved crucial in helping activists to organize worldwide protests only two days after the election on June 14th.  The Setade Ma Twitter stream did not end up being particularly useful, amassing only 125 followers (and excellent graphic design).  However, the Setade Ma Facebook group proved key. After the election it was transformed into the largest “where is my vote?” Facebook group and was used to organize the London, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington DC protest on June 14th.

The Facebook group organized by the Sedate Ma activists ended up being only one of the many Facebook groups (see right) created using the “where is my vote” (WiMV) meme and logo. There are dynamics of both centralization and decentralization at work here. There are 24 WiMV groups on Facebook and the Sedate Ma group is by far the largest with 3,000 members at this time. The other groups are smaller, with a few hundred to less than 10 members. This is not necessarily a weakness. Facebook allows groups to only message 5,000 members at a time, so Facebook groups can only be used for effective communication at low volume.

Some organizers, who may or may not be associated with Setade Ma, created a stand-alone web site, whereismyvote.org, to direct potential supporters to Facebook groups organizing protests in Toronto, Vancouver, Paris, Boston, and Winnipeg. It is generally a good idea to create a stand-along site to mirror and centralize information on the frustratingly decentralized Facebook (as recommended in DigiActive’s Facebook Guide). However, only three of the five links point to the pages indicated. In the flurry of event creation, centralized control seemed to have been difficult.

Another interesting Facebook action was the campaign to change your profile picture to the green WiMV icon (also at right). This meme appears to have been started by a smaller WiMV Facebook group and the profile action seems to have been that group’s  main purpose. The only information in the description section of the group is “If you voted for Mousavi change your profile picture to / WHERE IS MY VOTE? image / Join this group and invite your friends to do the same. lets make facebook green”.  (Green is the symbolic color of Islam and Iran.)  Changing profile pictures really leverages the network effects of Facebook. When one person changes their profile image that change is pushed out to all that person’s friends via the friend feed. Ideally, the following exchanges occur:

Finally, the organizers attempted to promote their events through citizen media sites, which have a wider audience than a Facebook group but are more accessible to activists than the mainstream media.  For example, A supporter posted a photo and links about the San Francisco protest on the site Now Public, which collects and distributes news from unconventional sources by letting citizen journalists upload their own stories.

Outcome: Based on the photos and video uploaded by WiMV supporters, it appears that international protests on June 14th occurred in San Francisco (USA), London (UK) , Dallas (USA), Paris (France), Dubai (UAE), Melbourne (Australia), Köln (Germany), Atlanta (USA), Washington DC (USA), Los Angeles (USA), Winnipeg (Canada), Boston (USA), and Toronto (Canada). At somes protests dozens were present, at others over 100.  (You can see a selection of images from the protests after the jump.)

It was certainly a successful example of fast, free, international collective action. The question is, where will the movement go r from here and will it be able to transform current enthusiasm and ad hoc organizing into an organizational structure with the stamina to continue a longer campaign?

Analysis: The WiMV campaign followed a decentralized structure that is common to digital activism campaigns built around high-profile issues.  However, was this decentralization a good thing for the cause? On the positive side, it is likely that more events were organized because people who became aware of the WiMV/June 14th meme could create their own Facebook page to organize an event in their area and invite their friends and contacts. This seems to be the case with the WiMV Melbourne, Dubai, and Atlanta groups. (Other local pages were created but they did not seems to organize protests.) In another benefit of localization, the very active Paris group created their own profile icon in French: “ou est leur vote?” (where is their vote?) and their own Blogspot blog, which acted as a stand-alone site to centralize information about their protest.

Unfortunately, the negatives of decentralization seem to be more substantial than the positives. The first reason is misinformation.  While the “official” DC protest was meant to take place at the Iranian Interests Section, someone posted on the wall of another group that the DC protest should be on the lawn of the White House.  Second, many of the groups were “identity” groups rather than “action” groups. People joined them to identify with the cause of free and fair elections in Iran, but no protests were organized within those groups.  People who potentially could have been recruited to attend a protest fell into the “dead zone” of inactive group.

The most serious concern with regard to decentralization is its implications for sustainability.  Supporters are spread across a miriad number of event groups on Facebook, which was effective enough for this first action, but how will these supporters be contacted for future actions that are not organized at the local level? (Also, what about people who attended the protests but are not members of the Facebook group?  Was their contact info collected?)

For true coordination beyond a high-attention meme, centralization is necessay and WiMV’s current structure on Facebook does not lend itself the the sustainable community which is most likely to lead to future collaboration and action. After the the explosion of activity for June 14th, people interested in continued action will need to come together into a single leadership team and then start reaching out to the group founders in an effort to get everyone on the same listserv and in the same group.  It will not be a fun or easy process but it will be necessary to create a sustainabile community for this issue.

Protest photos after the jump…

Read more »